Research
I currently work on the foundations of secure distributed computation in realistic settings. My guiding question is what it takes for cryptographic protocols to remain secure and efficient once they leave the whiteboard. That means running over incomplete or asynchronous networks, against adversaries that may corrupt a majority of the participants, and alongside many other protocols at the same time. I approach this question from several connected directions: secure multiparty computation, fault-tolerant distributed algorithms, composable security, and generic black-box compilers. I combine impossibility results and lower bounds with new constructions, aiming for protocols that are not only provably secure but also practical to deploy.
An emerging interest is extending these questions to quantum cryptography and quantum secure distributed computation: how quantum resources and adversaries change the guarantees we can achieve, their costs, and the interfaces needed for secure composition.
Secure Multiparty Computation
Related papers
- The Price of Agreement in Secure Multiparty Computation — ePrint 2026/2745
- Randomized Early-Stopping Byzantine Agreement with Applications to Round-Efficient MPC — ePrint 2026/2284
- On the Round Complexity of Dishonest-Majority MPC — TCC 2026
- Universally Composable Almost-Everywhere Secure Computation — JoC
- Is It Even Possible? On the Parallel Composition of Asynchronous MPC Protocols — TCC 2025
Distributed Systems
Related papers
- The Price of Agreement in Secure Multiparty Computation — ePrint 2026/2745
- Randomized Early-Stopping Byzantine Agreement with Applications to Round-Efficient MPC — ePrint 2026/2284
- On the Round Complexity of Dishonest-Majority MPC — TCC 2026
- Concurrent Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement in Expected-Constant Rounds, Revisited — TCC 2023
